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Notes
The Application of the Fourth Amendment
to Congressional Investigations
"We pride ourselves on having created a government of laws, not
men, but our congressional committees remain a notorious ex-
ception to that principle."*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the congressional investigation has become
one of the major forums for expressing social, economic, and po-
litical views. Because of its potential for gaining publicity and
public support, this forum may be utilized by congressmen and
private citizens as an essential tool for collecting information and
bringing about legislation or as a means to attain private advan-
tage.' However, the same factors which give the congressional
investigation the potential to bring about benefits also give it the
potential to destroy some of our basic freedoms.2
It is the purpose of this Note to analyze the major protec-
tions afforded a witness testifying before congressional investiga-
tions and to suggest a means by which the courts can make the
constitutional protections more meaningful. The limitations on
these investigations do not adequately shield the private citizen
from persecution, partly because the courts have never ade-
quately recognized all the factors in balancing the congressional
need for information against the individual's right to be free from
governmental interference, and partly because the courts refuse
to recognize the unique problems presented by the political reali-
* 1 Maslow, Fair Procedure in Congressional Investigations: A
Proposed Code, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 839, 885 (1954).
1. See, e.g., R. HARRis, Tm REAL VOICE (1965).
2. E.g., Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Braden
v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109 (1959). See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), in
which the Court upheld a contempt conviction arising out of a grand
jury investigation. Ullman asserted the fifth amendment as the ground
for his refusal to testify, arguing that since he was given no protection
from public condemnation and economic loss, he was not being given
the required immunity necessary to compel testimony against himself.
The Court explicitly recognized that public condemnation and economic
loss do result from being forced to give testimony against oneself, but
that social sanctions are not grounds for refusal to testify. See also
12 Stat. 333 (1862), as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 191-94 (1964), which pro-
vides that no witness is privileged to refuse to testify on the grounds
that his testimony may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him
infamous.
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ties of congressional investigations. The policy considerations
which have recently prompted the Supreme Court to protect the
individual's right to privacy against other types of governmental
interference are equally applicable to congressional investiga-
tions. After summarizing the current standards which protect
witnesses before congressional investigations and demonstrating
the inadequacies of those standards, this Note takes the view
that the Supreme Court should require Congress to show both a
need for the information and probable cause for believing that
the individual has such information. before allowing a congres-
sional subpoena of the individual.
II. THE HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS
Congress has traditionally believed that the power to appro-
priate funds implies the power to investigate to obtain facts per-
tinent to possible legislation or the proper administration of
existing laws.3 However, no investigation for a lawmaking pur-
pose was conducted in the House until 1827,4 and in the Senate
until 1859.5 Most of the investigations during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries dealt with the qualifications of the
3. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power
of Investigation, 40 HARv. L. REV. 153 (1926); Potts, Power of Legislative
Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 691, 708 (1926). Since
there is no express mention of a congressional power to investigate
pursuant to possible legislation, this power must be implied by one of
the express powers. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-74 (1927).
Leacos, Rights of Witnesses before Cong'essional Committees, 33 B.U.L.
REv. 337, 341 (1953). Such power may be implied from the power to
impeach under U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2; more specifically, art. 1, § 3 gives
the House the power to investigate all government employees subject
to impeachment. The Constitution also allows for investigations of elec-
tion returns and members' qualifications, art. 1, § 5; and for investiga-
tions to aid in ratification of treaties and appointments, art. 2, § 2. How-
ever, the most important justification for the power to investigate is the
legislative power, art. 1, §§ 1, 7 & 8. The real problem is to define the
scope of these powers. Landis, supra at 156.
4. The House Committee on Manufacturers planned to investigate
the effect of an upwards revision of tariff schedules upon domestic
manufacturers. The power of the House to investigate pursuant to
legislation was challenged by some of the legislators, but was sus-
tained. 4 CONG. DEB. 889 (1828).
5. The Senate Select Committee planned to investigate the inva-
sion of the Harper's Ferry Armory and report whether legislation was
necessary to preserve the peace of the country and safety of property.
The resolution empowering such an investigation gave the committee the
power to subpoena persons and papers. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st
Sess. 141 (1859). See McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical
Development, 18 U. Cm. L. REV. 425 (1951).
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members of Congress or alleged mismanagement within the
government."
Since 1792 it has been recognized that the power to inves-
tigate implies the power to issue subpoenas, compel testimony,
and convict a contumacious witness for civil contempt of Con-
gress.7 However, the effectiveness of a civil contempt conviction
was limited by the duration of imprisonment, s a requirement
of a majority vote of the offended house,9 and judicial review
of the proceedings.10 As a result, in 1857 Congress passed a
criminal statute making it a misdemeanor for a witness to will-
fully refuse to answer any question pertinent to the subject
under inquiry.1' The first important Supreme Court review of
6. Landis, supra note 3, at 168-91; Potts, supra note 3, at 719-25.
The first congressional investigation was held in 1792 to determine why
Major General St. Clair had been defeated by the Indians. ANNALs OF
CONG. 490 (1792). As the tasks of government have become more com-
plex, the use of investigations has greatly increased. Stamps, The
Power of Congress To Inquire and Punish for Contempt, 4 BAYLOR L.
REV. 29 (1951). See Fulbright, Congressional Investigations: Signifi-
cance for the Legislative Process, 18 U. Cm. L. REV. 440 (1951); McGeary,
supra note 5; McKay, Congressional Investigations and the Supreme
Court, 51 CAum. L. REV. 267, 290 (1963).
7. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 224 (1821) (recog-
nized a contempt proceeding against a person other than a member of
Congress); Burdett v. Colman, [1811] 14 Easts' Rep. 1; Regina v. Paty,
[1790] 2 Lord Raym. 1105. See Fisk, Compulsory Testimony of the
Congressional Witness and the Fifth Amendment, 15 OKLA. L. REV. 151,
153 (1962). See also C. BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESs, App. A, 191-216
(1959). Beck points out that the first contempt of Congress case arose
in 1795 out of a House investigation of bribery of one of its members.
8. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821). The
Court argued that the power to evoke testimony was necessary to keep
a contumacious witness in jail. Since Congress cannot evoke testimony
if it is not in session, the imprisonment had to cease upon adjournment.
Furthermore, civil contempt is more likely to elicit the information
sought because a witness may gain his freedom upon complying with
the demands.
9. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
10. In Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471, 481 (No. 10,375) (C.C.D.C.
1848), the court stated that Congress was the sole judge of its contempt
citations. This position was reversed in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168 (1880). See Alfange, Congressional Investigations and the
Fickle Court, 30 U. Cnq. L. REV. 113 (1961), for an excellent history.
11. 11 Stat. 155 (1857), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1964). Because
it is a criminal proceeding, the courts must recognize all the safeguards
afforded in such proceedings. Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576
(1958). Both civil and criminal contempt proceedings can be brought
against the same individual. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897).
Because of the limitations upon the civil proceeding, Congress uses
the criminal proceeding almost exclusively. McGeary, supra note 5, at
428; Sky, Judicial Review of Congressional Investigations: Is There an
Alternative to Contempt?, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 400-01 (1962).
19681
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the constitutionality of this law and the permissible scope of
congressional investigation came in Kilbourn v. Thompson.:2
Since the resolution to investigate contained no indication of a
legislative purpose,' 3 the Court held that the investigation was an
investigation into the private affairs of an individual and, there-
fore, beyond the scope of the power of Congress.' 4 The Court
maintained that an investigation which could not result in valid
legislation was judicial in character and, since the Constitution
explicitly divided the functions of government into three separ-
ate branches, the legislature could not perform a judicial func-
tion. The Court concluded that a valid legislative purpose was
necessary for a proper investigation.' i
In McGrain v. Daughtery,'6 arising out of the Teapot Dome
scandal, the Court was forced to find some rationale to uphold a
contempt conviction in order to avoid a head-on collision with
Congress and public opinion. 17 As in Kilbourn, the Court asserted
that Congress could not investigate in a judicial or administra-
tive capacity, that Congress had the power to investigate only
because it "is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legis-
lative function .... A legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively in the absence of information respecting the condi-
tions which the legislation is intended to affect or change .... "Is
However, in the absence of a stated legislative purpose, the
Court created the presumption that since the subject matter was
appropriate for legislation, Congress had a legislative purpose.
In the twenty years following McGrain there was very little
judicial development in this area.' 9 Although the Court heard a
large number of cases involving New Deal investigations into
economic problem areas which had previously been thought to
12. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
13. Id. at 194-95.
14. Id. at 190.
15. Justice Miller, who wrote the opinion, personally felt that
Congress could compel testimony only when performing one of thejudicial tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. Alfange, supra note
10, at 117. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 204-24 (1821),
for an earlier presentation of the separation of powers argument.
16. 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
17. Id. at 178. The case is factually indistinguishable from Kil-
bourn on this issue. The difference must be in the notoriety of the
scandal under investigation. The public reaction to the Teapot Dome
scandal played a major part in the Court's subsequent treatment of the
problem. See Landis, supra note 3; Potts, supra note 3.
18. 273 U.S. 135, 174-75 (1927).
19. See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929). This case
extended the presumption of a valid legislative purpose from Congress
as a whole to a congressional committee.
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be outside the realm of congressional investigation, it acquiesced
in the judgment of Congress as to the valid scope of the investi-
gatory power,20 imposing only procedural requirements. 2'
The contempt cases arising after World War II were of a
completely different character. Congress investigated the polit-
ical beliefs, affairs, and associations of private individuals as a
result of the widespread fear of subversion and Communist
infiltration into American life and government. 22  Because of
this change in the subject matter under investigation and the
effect upon the rights of the individuals investigated, the em-
phasis of the Court's review shifted from the permissible scope of
congressional investigations to a balancing of the government's
interest in collecting information for possible legislation with the
rights guaranteed to the individual by the Bill of Rights.23
With very few exceptions, 24 the Court in the last twenty
years has refused to apply the legislative purpose requirement
so boldly asserted in Kilbourn. In balancing the government's
interest in gathering information against the interest in protect-
ing the rights of the individual guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
the Court has never found the balance in favor of the individual.25
20. See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937); Jurney v.
MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunning-
ham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1938); McKay, supra note 6. In Townsend the court stated that "a
legislative inquiry may be as broad, as searching, and as exhaustive
as is necessary to make effective the constitutional powers of Con-
gress. .. ." 95 F.2d at 361.
21. See cases cited note 26 infra.
22. The House of Representatives created the Special House Com-
mittee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities (The Dies Com-
mittee) in 1938. 83 CoNG. REc. 7568 (1938). In 1945 it became a
standing committee. 60 Stat. 812 (1946). The Committee is authorized
to investigate un-American propaganda, activities, and all other ques-
tions in relation thereto which might aid Congress in passing remedial
legislation.
23. See, e.g., Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178 (1957). In these cases, the Court discussed in detail the
basic authority of HUAC to investigate the affairs of private citizens.
However, since Braden, the Court has consistently refused to consider
this issue.
24. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953). This case, although
purportedly dealing with freedom of the press, was reversed on an
artificially narrow interpretation of the word "lobbying." See also
United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1953).
25. E.g., Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v.
United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109 (1959). As will be demonstrated, under the present terms of the
balance it would be almost impossible for the Court to find in favor of
the individual. See C. BECK, CONTEMPT OF CoNGREss, App. B (1959), for
19681
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The Supreme Court generally has avoided reviewing the underly-
ing authority of Congress to investigate by reversing contempt
convictions on technical errors.26 *While there is some merit in
enforcing strict compliance with technical requirements, it may
be inferred that the sympathy of the Court is now with the re-
luctant witness. Yet the Court apparently wishes to avoid mak-
ing a major decision limiting the congressional power of investi-
gation.2 7
III. THE CONTEMPT PROCEDURE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
The cases in which the courts are requested to review the
authority of a congressional investigation to compel testimony
are significant because of the publicity afforded them and the
political and legal implications associated with them.28 Criminal
proceedings are normally brought to punish a witness for con-
tempt of Congress where the witness refuses to provide either
documents or testimony demanded by a congressional investiga-
tion. Under federal statute every individual summoned has a
duty to answer any question pertinent to the subject under in-
a listing of congressional contempt citations, the defenses asserted, and
the outcome of the cases from 1944 to 1957. The individual has won
in over half of the cases in which his refusal to testify was based upon
the fifth amendment because the Court does not balance this right.
However, witnesses have not been successful in over 30 cases asserting
the first amendment defenses.
26. See, e.g., Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966) (re-
versing on the basis that the subject of inquiry was never specified or
authorized by the Committee as required by its rules, thus there was no
lawful delegation of power to the subcommittee); Yellin v. United
States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963) (reversing on the basis that the Committee-
HUAC-violated its own Rule IV by failing to consider the witness's
request that he be interrogated in executive session because of pos-
sible injury to his reputation); Russell v. United States, 364 U.S. 749
(1962) (reversing on the basis that the grand jury indictment did not
state the question under inquiry at the time of the alleged default);
Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961) (reversing on the basis that
Ithaca, more than sixty-five miles from Albany, is geographically too
far away from the capital area to be within the scope of the authorized
investigation of Albany); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)
(pertinency); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (strict defini-
tion of lobbying); United States v. Fleischman, 349 U.S. 349 (1950)
(lack of quorum). See also Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352
(D.C. Cir. 1938) (reasonable mistake of fact); United States v. Klein-
man, 107 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1952) (publicity and news coverage).
27. Shapiro, Judicial Review: The Supreme Court's Supervision
of Congressional Investigations, 15 VAtm. L. REv. 535 (1962). See au-
thorities cited note 58 infra.
28. McKay, supra note 6.
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quiry.29 If a witness fails to fulfill this obligation and the com-
mittee refuses to excuse such failure, this fact is reported to and
filed with either the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House who certifies it to the appropriate United States attor-
ney.3 0 While no vote of the offended House is required before
such complaint is filed, this practice has become established by
custom.3 1
Under this procedure the individual must risk criminal pro-
secution to test his doubts as to the lawful limits of his duty to
respond to the subpoena and answer a question. Thus, the indi-
vidual must risk a criminal conviction to test whether he has
construed his duty correctly,32 although it involves complex
problems of statutory interpretation and ad hoc balancing of vari-
ous constitutional rights. An erroneous decision, even in good
faith, does not protect the contumacious witness.33  No prior
determination of the issue is available, either in the form of a
hearing for an injunction against the enforcement of the sub-
poena 34 or for a declaratory judgment to determine the witness'
duty to testify.35 The reluctance to determine the duty of the
29. 11 Stat. 155 (1857), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1964).
30. 11 Stat. 156 (1857), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1964).
31. Sky, supra note 11, at 401 n.7.
32. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929). This gamble
becomes particularly dangerous when called before a congressional com-
mittee such as HUAC. "It would be difficult to imagine a less explicit
authorizing resolution." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 202
(1957). Good faith is no excuse.
It is interesting to speculate whether a misinterpretation of one's
duty to testify is a mistake of law or a mistake of fact. If the latter, it
would appear that the Court has probably abolished a mens rea re-
quirement. Yet it is hard to believe that this is an appropriate usage of
absolute liability.
33. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208 (1957).
34. Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The
court reasoned that since it could not enjoin Congress from passing an
unconstitutional law, it could not enjoin Congress from trying to enforce
an unconstitutional subpoena. However, these situations are not analo-
gous for a bill cannot be unconstitutional until it becomes a law while
a subpoena may be illegal before enforced. The result of this kind of
reasoning is that the witness must guess as to the legality of the
subpoena and hope the courts will not enforce it. See N.Y. Times,
Aug. 15 & 16, 1966, at 1, col. 1, for an account of a court trying to
enjoin an investigation.
35. Pauling v. Eastland, 288 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Mins v.
McCarthy, 209 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Fischler v. McCarthy, 117 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964). A declaratoryjudgment requires that there be an actual case in controversy; consent
of the parties is not sufficient. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 305 (1962); see 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1159 (1961). The idea
of using civil instead of criminal contempt has received some judicial
1968]
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witness to testify may result from the feeling by the courts that
any restraint of a congressional investigation at this stage would
be premature and would violate the separation of powers prin-
ciple s 6 Yet the Supreme Court, in a similar situation, has real-
ized that the practical effect of such a situation is to leave the
individual subject to the discretion of the government official
and that this is precisely the situation in which the protections
provided by the warrant procedures of the fourth amendment
are required. Statutory safeguards are not enough, particularly
when those standards can be invoked only at the risk of criminal
prosecution.3 7
The consequences of the courts' refusal to make a prior
determination of the validity of a congressional subpoena are
particularly onerous. In order for the individual to test his duty
to respond to the subpoena he must comply with it, appear before
the investigating committee and make his objections known. If
he refuses to comply none of the major defenses is available to
him.3 8 However, once he has appeared at the investigation, the
social stigma of being associated with the evil being investigated
attaches to him. The mere fact of being subpoenaed by HUAC,
for example, and thus associated in the public mind with Com-
munism can be disastrous; 39 refusing to testify merely enhances
support. See United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 616-17 (D.D.C.
1961), rev'd, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also S. 2161, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961) (Senator Javits' bill suggesting the same thing). The
courts clearly have the power to enforce congressional subpoenas in a
civil action. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
214 (1946); see Sky, supra note 11, at 415-17.
Criminal sanctions are undesirable both because the witness is
forced to wage his liberty on his interpretation of the statute against
the court's balancing of his rights, and because the process does not
help the investigation get the desired information for it is purely puna-
tive. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964).
36. Fischler v. McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
This rationale is correct only insofar as it is limited to decisions based
upon scope, pertinency, or validity of the subject matter under investi-
gation. If the defense of the witness is based upon a constitutional
privilege to remain silent, a prior determination of the validity of that
defense would in no way infringe upon the separation of powers prin-
ciple. The court would merely be carrying out one of its functions
and would not be limiting the power of Congress to investigate as
respects scope or purpose (the factors which are within the realm of
Congress' discretion). See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
Pauling v. Eastland, 288 F.2d 126, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Fischler v.
McCarthy, 218 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1954); Sky, supra note 11.
37. Camara v. Municipal Court, 389 U.S. 523 (1967).
38. Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962); McPhaul v.
United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
39. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957); see
HUAC Rule IV.
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the publicity and the resultant social stigma.40
IV. THE LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS
Although the individual undeniably has a duty to testify
and to cooperate with Congress in its efforts to gather informa-
tion,4 1 this duty does have limits.
A. TiE SCOPE OF INQUIRY
In Kilbourn v. Thompson,4 2 the Court decided that since
the Constitution divided our government into a triparte system,
and since it did not expressly give Congress the power to investi-
gate, Congress could constitutionally investigate only when exer-
cising an expressed power which implied the power to investi-
gate.4 3 The valid legislative purpose limitation requires that the
congressional purpose for the investigation must be the collec-
tion of information helpful in its legislative function, and that
the area must be one in which Congress can, in fact, pass valid
legislation. This is the only limitation on the scope or subject
matter of congressional investigations.
Although the requirement was boldly asserted in Kilbourn,
the Court has, through a series of presumptions, effectively emas-
culated this requirement. The first such presumption was that
since the topic investigated was within the scope of the con-
gressional power to legislate, Congress had a valid legislative
purpose.4 4  Two years later, in 1929, the Court extended this
presumption of legislative purpose to investigations by congres-
sional committees.4 r The valid legislative purpose requirement
was further emasculated in United States v. Bryan,4 6 which
involved the validity of a subpoena duces tecum issued by HUAC.
Since a declaration of purpose was presented, the court presumed
that the subject matter under investigation was appropriate for
valid legislation.4 7 This presumption was made almost irrebut-
40. See United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 115 (1964) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
41. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959); Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
42. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
43. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 204-21 (1821);
Alfange, supra note 10.
44. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177, 178 (1927).
45. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
46. 72 F. Supp. 48 (D.D.C. 1947).
47. Id. Judge Holtzoff stated:
19681
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table in United States v. Josephson.48
Subsequently, two cases have attacked the illusion of legisla-
tive omnipotence. First, in United States v. Rumely,"9 a case
dealing with right-wing lobbying activities, Justice Frankfurter
found certain lobbying to be outside the scope of HUAC's au-
thorizing resolution. Then, in United States v. Icardi,50 a case
arising out of an investigation by the Subcommittee on Armed
Services, a lower court held that the presumption of innocence
outweighed the government's presumption of a valid legislative
purpose. Moreover, there have recently been some "respectable
doubts" whether the actual purposes of HUAC are consistent
with its statutory purposes.51 Thus, the government may again
If the subject under scrutiny may have any possible relevance
and materiality, no matter how remote, to some possible legis-
lation, it is within the power of Congress to investigate the
matter. Moreover, the relevancy and the materiality of the
subject matter must be presumed.
Id. at 61. See Fulbright, supra note 6, wt 442.
48. 165 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1947). See Gojack v. United States,
384 U.S. 702 (1966); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
49. 345 U.S. 41 (1953). Justice Frankfurter came to this decision
by giving a very limited definition to lobbying activities. This case
could have been analyzed as a pertinency, scope, or first amendment
question; but the Court, after discussing some of the constitutional
problems of the authorizing resolution, decided that the case could be
resolved most easily by pardoning the defendant on the definition
rationale.
50. 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956). This was the first case since
Kilbourn which directly held an investigation lacked legislative pur-
pose. See Shapiro, supra note 27, at 539.
51. See Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 209 (1957). These cases attacked the pre-
sumptions but maintained the separation of powers argument and the
legislative purpose requirement. It has been suggested that the Court
should abandon the legislative purpose requirements. The argument is
that Congress investigates for many purposes other than to legislate and
the Court should recognize this by abandoning the legislative purpose
limitation. Acceptance of this position would permit the Court to shed
the presumptions which insulate it from reality, thereby allowing it to
look more realistically at the situation. The Court could allow non-
legislative investigations which are necessary and strike down investi-
gations which, although clothed in legislative purpose, are designed to
expose the witness. Such a decision should be acceptable to Congress
for it would expand as well as contract the investigatory power. Sky,
supra note 11. The problem with this position is that the Court will
have to judge the validity of an investigation solely upon the motives
of Congressmen.
Watkins also attacked the authorization of HUAC for vagueness,
stating that it was so nebulous that it was impossible to determine a
valid scope of inquiry. The Court set out four ways in which the
investigation could inform the witness of the subject under inquiry:
1) resolution authorizing the investigation; 2) statement of the chairman;
[Vol. 52:665
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have to prove a legislative purpose.52 However, this burden
may be meaningless, for the Court has held that the motives of
the investigators are irrelevant so long as Congress has a valid
purpose for authorizing the investigation. 3 Enough of this pur-
pose is usually mixed into the rhetoric of the investigators to
satisfy the Court. Moreover, the Court still maintains the pre-
sumption of a valid legislative purpose.
54
B. THE PERTINENCY OF THE QUESTION
Another limitation on congressional investigations is based
upon statute. Under federal statute55 a witness before a con-
gressional investigation is guilty of a misdemeanor if he will-
fully fails to answer any question pertinent to the subject under
inquiry. This statute imposes two requirements on an investi-
gation. First, the witness must be made aware of the pertinency
of the question. If he objects to a question and refuses to an-
swer, he must be told the subject under inquiry and the manner
in which the propounded question is pertinent to such topic.56
3) delegation of power to the subcommittee; and 4) a direct statement
to the witness.
52. Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
53. Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Hutcheson v.
United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 127-33 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 345 U.S. 178, 200
(1957). In each of these cases the record clearly indicates that the
motive of the investigators, which the Court refused to recognize, was
exposure. This may be irrelevant for the Court has held that bad
motives would not invalidate an investigation so long as a congres-
sional purpose is being served. Watkins v. United States, supra. See
Shapiro, supra note 27, at 550-52. Senator Fulbright argues that since
any problem can be a subject for federal legislation, no fields are
immune from congressional investigations. Fulbright, supra note 6, at
442.
54. Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962); Braden v.
United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S.
399 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
55. 11 Stat. 155 (1957), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1964).
56. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1957). See
Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 468-70 (1961); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1959). These requirements exist because of
the criminal penalty involved. The individual must be afforded all
the rights provided in any other criminal proceedings. Gojack v.
United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Deutch v. United States, supra; Sacher
v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958). One of these rights is to know
before acting that he may be violating a law. United States v.
Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U.S. 81 (1921). The right to object to pertinency cannot be waived.
Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1953); accord,
Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949). But it must be as-
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Next, because the government has the obligation to over-
come the individual's presumption of innocence, 57 the govern-
ment must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of
the crime, 58 including the pertinency of the question and the will-
fulness of the refusal to testify.59 However, the pertinency re-
serted. McPhaul v. United States, 364 tr.S. 372 (1960). The require-
ment that the witness must be made aware of the pertinency may
eliminate a mistake of law defense on this issue.
57. Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958); Sinclair v. United
States, 279 U.S. 263, 296-97 (1929). The burden of proof is necessarily
upon the government. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (con-
curring opinion).
58. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 165 (1955); Bowers v.
United States, 202 F.2d 447, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Although it can hardly
be considered a limitation on the congressional power of investigation,
obviously the committee, subcommittee, and Attorney General must
follow the rules and procedures. These rules are for the protection of
the witness. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Liacos, Rights
of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 B.U.L. REV. 337, 383
(1953); 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 507. The Court in recent years, after appeal
to the great platitudes, has decided the cases on enduring trivia, ap-
parently to avoid deciding how much weight will be given to the indi-
vidual when balancing his rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
against the national interest in having a well-informed legislature.
Thus, the Court boldly asserts that there is no power of exposure:
The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent
in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes .... But, as broad as
is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs of individuals withoutjustification in terms of the functions of the Congress.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). See Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544-46 (1963); Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 190 (1881). Yet, the Court makes its decisions upon trivial
errors. Text accompanying note 26 supra; see McKay, Congressional
Investigations; Significance for the Legislative Purpose, 18 U. Cxi. L.
REv. 440 (1951). If the investigators fail to respond to the technical
objections raised by the witness, the witness has no remedy other than
refusing to answer and risking contempt. Yellin v. United States, 374
U.S. 109 (1963). While there is some merit to these decisions, the fact
that in earlier cases technical errors were not fatal indicates that a more
reasonable interpretation of these cases is that the sympathy of the
Court is now with the accused. E.g., Braden v. United States, 365 U.S.
431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). Yet the Court at this time finds
it politically expedient not to attack the Congress and divide the Court
on this issue.
59. Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); Braden v.
United States, 365 U.S. 436, 436-38 (1961); Sacher v. United States, 356
U.S. 576 (1958); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 289-99 (1929).
This may have to be beyond a reasonable doubt. Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155, 165 (1955). See generally Kent, Compulsory Dis-
closure and the First Amendment-The Scope of Judicial Review, 43
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quirement has become almost meaningless 60 since the courts
have allowed testimony of a much wider scope than would be
allowed under the relevancy limitation of the rules of evidence.61
Furthermore, because of politicians' tendencies to frame resolu-
tions in grandiose terms6 2 and the courts' willingness to allow
testimony on the basis that the answers might be helpful in
evaluating the testimony,63 pertinency has become almost impos-
sible to determine.6 4 The willfulness requirement demands only
that the refusal to testify be deliberate. 65
C. THE BILL OF RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
The duty of an individual to testify is premised on the con-
gressional need to collect information. The courts, when inter-
preting this duty, assume that the rights guaranteed to the
witness by the Bill of Rights will be respected by the congres-
sional committee."6 However, this duty may become a burden
upon the individual because those protections are not absolute
and their scope has not been defined adequately by the Court.
1. The Fifth Amendment
Although literally the fifth amendment right not to be a
MAruQ. L. REv. 443, 453-58 (1961); Redlich, Rights of Witnesses Before
Congressional Committees: Effects of Recent Supreme Court Deci-
sions, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1126, 1136-42 (1961); Comment, Congressional
Investigating Committees-Scope of Power to Compel Testimony and
Production of Records, 8 N.Y.U.L.F. 133 (1962). Of the 11 cases between
1944 and 1957 in which the defendant heavily relied on pertinency as a
defense before HUAC, 7 were reversed on that ground. C. BECK, CON-
TEMPT OF CONGRESS, App. B (1959).
60. E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 124 (1959).
61. United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
62. See Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
63. Sheldon v. United States, 280 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Trumbo
v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949). These cases held that
questions such as "are or were you a communist" are pertinent to in-
vestigations by HUAC. Consequently, the broad interpretation of per-
tinency gives a witness almost no protection against mind-probing ven-
tures by Congressmen.
64. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957).
65. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948). See
United States v. Lamont, 18 F.R.D. 27 (D.C.N.Y.), aff'd, 236 F.2d 312(2d Cir. 1956), for an excellent analysis of the steps that must be
taken by the committee in order to bring a contempt citation.
66. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1957). See
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 755 (1962); Deutch v. United
States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263,
296 (1929); cases cited note 41 supra.
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
witness against oneself is restricted to criminal proceedings, 67
the applicability of this privilege before congressional investiga-
tions has long been recognized6 s and is now firmly established. 0
The reasoning of the Court in allowing the application of the
privilege in noncriminal proceedings is that if the witness could
be forced to testify he might be forced to provide the first link
in a chain of evidence which would eventually lead to criminal
prosecution.70 Despite the fact that the fifth amendment does
grant the witness the privilege of refusing to answer if his
testimony might lead to criminal prosecution, Congress may
eliminate this privilege by granting him immunity from criminal
prosecution if it feels that his testimony is more valuable to
society than any possibility of criminadly prosecuting him.71 Al-
67. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "No person . .. shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .. ."
68. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886). See McCarthy
v. Arnastein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1882); Note, Applicability
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Legislative Investigations,
49 COLtUM. L. Rv. 87 (1949). However, .t was not until 1950 that the
fifth amendment was used to protect a witness before a grand jury
investigation. See Blair v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950), in which
defendant refused to answer questions concerning her activities in the
Communist Party because of possible prosecution under the Smith
Act. The possibility of application to congressional investigations was
first explicitly recognized in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950)
(dictum).
69. Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1954); Emspack v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190 (1954); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1954).
The main issue in these cases was whether the witness had adequately
invoked the protection of the fifth amendment in choosing to rely pri-
marily upon the first amendment right to silence. The Court did
recognize the stigma attached to invoking the fifth amendment, Quinn
v. United States, supra at 164, but rejected the first amendment argu-
ment as novel. Emspack v. United States, supra at 195. In Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court held that forcing the
production of papers to be used against Boyd was a violation of the
fourth amendment and that part of the fifth protecting a man from
being a witness against himself. However, the holding has been lim-
ited to the facts of the case. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1946).
70. Emspack v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1954); see also Wheel-
din v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963). However, the fifth amendment
appears to protect against both state and federal prosecutions. Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
71. Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1964). The constitu-
tionality of the Act was upheld in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 (1956). The Court stated that the Act gave immunity from state as
well as federal prosecutions. The statute was passed in response to
the large number of witnesses before HUAC who invoked the fifth
amendment. D. FELLMAN, Tim DEFENrANT's RIGHTS 170 (1958). The
technicalities of the Act are: 1) a vote of two-thirds of the members of
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though this has often been called an exchange, it is doubtful
that the immunity from criminal prosecution adequately com-
pensates the witness for he may be socially persecuted because
of the elicited testimony.
72
Even if Congress does not grant immunity, the fifth amend-
ment does not afford the congressional witness adequate protec-
tion. Because the privilege of refusing to testify is limited to
testimony which might tend to incriminate, if a witness does
decide to invoke its protection, the implication is that he has
reason to fear criminal prosecution.73 Thus, although the fifth
amendment should be regarded as a protection of the innocent
from unfounded and tyrannical prosecutions, 74 the requirement
the committee is required to grant the immunity; 2) the immunity is
complete as to "any transaction, matter, or thing" concerning which the
witness is required to testify or produce evidence; 3) the witness must
have claimed the privilege against self-incrimination; 4) an order of a
federal district court must be secured to require the testimony; 5) the
testimony so compelled cannot be used as evidence in any criminal
proceeding "in any court;" and 6) the Attorney General must be noti-
fied before Congress or the committee votes on it. A previous im-
munity statute was repealed in 1862 because of the rush of willing
witnesses who desired to be free from criminal prosecution. A. BARTH,
GOVERNMENT BY INvEsTIGATION 131 (1955).
72. See 2 U.S.C. § 193 (1964); United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95,
115-23 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422 (1956); Kalven, Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt
Opinion, 27 U. Ca. L. REV. 315 (1960). Federal law provides that no
witness is privileged to refuse to answer on the ground that such testi-
mony may render him infamous. 2 U.S.C. § 193 (1964).
It has been argued that forcing a witness to give testimony
which leads to social sanctions is a deprivation of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law under the fifth amendment. Hannah v.
Larch, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). The Court denied the defense on the theory
that the administrative commission was acting in a purely investigatory
capacity and was not trying to ascertain individual guilt. The Court
said:
It [the commission] does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials
or determine anyone's civil or criminal liability. It does not
issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish, or impose any legal
sanctions. It does not make any determinations depriving any-
one of his life, liberty, or property. In short, the Commission
does not and cannot take any affirmative action which will af-
fect an individual right. The only purpose of its existence is to
find facts which may subsequently be used as the basis for
legislative or executive action.
Id. at 441. The essence of the opinion is that the public, not the com-
mission, has deprived the defendant of his life, liberty, and property
without due process of law, and this is not prohibited by the fifth or
fourteenth amendments.
73. The fear is that by invoking the fifth amendment the witness
will be admitting his guilt, such as becoming a "Fifth Amendment
Communist."
74. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955); Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908).
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that the witness must clearly assert the privilege before the
committee 75 forces the witness to reveal many matters by impli-
cation. These revelations may contain information which the
witness wishes, and has a constitutional right to keep private.
Thus an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege exposes him
to social persecution. 76 The great number of witnesses who refuse
to utilize the fifth amendment's absolute defense against con-
tempt conviction and base their refusal to answer on other
grounds evidences the efficacy of the social sanctions that are
brought to bear against a witness who intimates his guilt by
pleading the fifth amendment.77 These people would rather risk
the outcome of criminal prosecution than face the social sanctions
and the moral perjury7 8 involved in relying upon the fifth
amendment.79
2. The First Amendment
Although the first amendment is narrowly worded, it is well
established that its protection of freedom of speech and associa-
tion restricts all forms of governmental action.80 It was first
thought that action which did not prohibit the free exercise of
these rights, but only invaded the privacy of the beliefs and
exposed them to the public, was not prohibited. Congressional
75. The reason for requiring the witness to clearly assert the
privilege is to prevent his "toying" with the committee. Hutcheson v.
United States, 369 U.S. 599, 614 (1962); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S.
155, 164 (1955) ; Emspack v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 195 (1955).
76. Liacos, supra note 58, at 370. The Supreme Court has allowed
the states to take severe economic penalties against persons who invoke
the fifth amendment. Cohen v. Hurley, Z-66 U.S. 117 (1961); Nelson v.
County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468
(1958). But see Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (overruling
Cohen).
77. See C. BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGFIESs, App. B (1959).
78. Refusing to testify on the basis of the fifth amendment when
the motivation to assert the privilege is reluctance to testify rather
than fear of criminal prosecution is a form of perjury.
79. E.g., Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Russell v.
United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456
(1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1960); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). See Meiklejohn, The Balancing of
Self Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CA i. L. REV. 4 (1961).
The fifth amendment grants absolute immunity when applicable. Bar-
enblatt v. United States, supra at 126.
80. It is arguable that the first amendment's freedom of speech
implies the freedom not to speak. Comment, Rights of Witnesscs
Before Congressional Investigating Commitees, 7 VnL. L. REv. 84 (1961).
Yet the Court has never accepted this position and has implicitly re-
jected it by the repeated assertion that the individual has a duty to
testify. E.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957).
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investigatory committees imposed no direct interference with
the witness' freedoms, and it was argued that the Constitution
did not protect the timid from governmental actions which would
bring about social sanctions.8 ' United States v. Watkins,82 how-
ever, reversed this position, by recognizing that the first amend-
ment did protect the privacy of the contents of speech. Yet
this right is not unlimited because society's need for and the
individual's right to privacy must be balanced against the gov-
ernment's need for information.8 3
The idea of balancing the first amendment rights has long
given the Court difficulty. As stated in Konigsberg v. State
Bar,8 4 the first amendment does not protect certain types of
speech and, hence, does not prohibit all legislation restricting
speech and association.8 5 Although the early cases which upheld
such legislation were limited to legislation which was general in
nature and nondiscriminatory, since World War II courts have
upheld legislation which discriminates against the expression of
particular political beliefs if connected with the threat of sub-
versive physical activity. 6 By removing the qualification of
time for counterargument the Court materially altered the clear
and present danger doctrine, 7 thereby eliminating the possibil-
ity for effective review of legislation in any area in which Con-
gress determines that there is a clear and present danger. The
Court will yield to the decision of Congress that there is the possi-
bility of an eventual danger and thus has made its test as to
whether this danger is clear and present meaningless. Since
the Court allows such legislation, it follows that the Court also
allows investigations for the purpose of exposing such dangers,
although such investigations may infringe upon the rights of the
individual. Moreover, since the Court presumes that valid legis-
lation may follow an investigation in an area appropriate for
legislation, there can be no true ad hoc balancing of each case.
Furthermore, the governmental need for information should not
be presumed by the courts. The danger in such a presumption
81. United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1947).
82. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
83. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959); Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957).
84. 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961).
85. E.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
86. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
87. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). This was emasculated by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
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is that it permits Congress to establish by fiat the specific need
and, a fortiori, the weight to be accorded such need. Such an
abdication to Congress is undesirable.
The idea of affording the individual no greater protection
from investigations than from legislation appears reasonable on
its face. Yet this argument is specious in two respects. First,
investigations lack the safeguards built into the remainder of the
legislative process. In addition, the protections afforded during
investigations, qualified as they are by the presumptions that
the legislation is valid and for a legislative purpose, are not com-
parable to those afforded the individual after legislation has been
enacted.
Even accepting the premise that the Court truly does bal-
ance on an ad hoc basis, the terms in which it balances the indi-
vidual's right of silence against the nation's interest in gathering
information dictate that the interests of the congressional inves-
tigation will always prevail.88 The Court weighs the rights of
one individual against the needs of an entire nation.8 9 The
Court fails to recognize that it is not one individual's interest
in free speech but the nation's interest in free speech that is in
the balance. The protection afforded the privilege of one person
to remain silent affects the manner in which all other people
exercise the privilege. On the opposite side, the Court does not
weigh Congress' need for the particular information sought,90 but
88. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. '72 (1959), in which the Court
balanced the individual's right to privacy against the state's interest in
self-preservation. See also C. BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS, App. B
(1959). Beck points out that the witness has been unsuccessful on first
amendment grounds in all 30 cases from HUAC in which the witness
asserted this defense.
89. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); see generally
Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 756-51 (1962).
90. The Court has said that it would independently weigh the
need of Congress for this information. Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 126, 134 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198-99
(1957). See Alfange, Congressional Investigations and the Fickle Court,
30 U. Cin. L. REv. 113, 130-39 (1961). Yet there is no evidence of this.
For example, the Court allows purely cumulative evidence. Liveright
v. United States, 280 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See Deutch v. United
States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431
(1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). It has been argued that the con-
gressional committee should have to prove a need for the evidence and
that it is not merely cumulative, Uphaus v. Wayman, 360 U.S. 72, 82-84
(1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Frantz, Wilkinson, Braden, and Deutch:
The Legislative Investigation Cases, 21 LAw iN TRAxsinON 219 (1961); 10
Am. U.L. REV. 64 (1962); that if the information comes from hostile
witnesses it is meaningless, Kalven, supra note 72, at 327; and that
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rather the interest in possible legislation which would affect
the whole country.
Regardless of the terms in which it is done, balancing does
not afford the witness satisfactory protection, for the individual
will always fear that his freedom may be eventually balanced
away at a time when it becomes most important that these rights
be recognized. For freedom of speech to be meaningful it must
be consistently recognized 9 ' so that the individual may rely
upon it when determining his general course of conduct. Fur-
thermore, the privilege must prevent unnecessary exposure. If
the freedom is not recognized before the individual is forced to
appear at an investigation, the committee can use the same pro-
cedure as it does under the fifth amendment:9 2 force the witness
to refuse to answer, issue a contempt citation, publicly expose
the witness as being unwilling to testify, and then let the court
the information could be gathered in other ways, Auerbach, Some Com-
ments on the Case for the House Un-American Activities Committee, 47
MumIN. L. REV. 593 (1963).
91. Numerous commentators have advocated that the Court should
look beyond the legitimacy of the investigation and actively balance
the need for such information against the deprivation of liberties which
such an investigation would cause. Alfange, supra note 90, at 169;
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1438-50
(1962); Summers, The First Amendment As a Restraint on the Power of
Congress To Investigate, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 459 (1960); The First Amend-
ment: What Factors Should Be Considered in Striking the Balance
Under Barenblatt?, 20 LAw iN TA.NsiTioN 41 (1960). It may be argued
that the clear and present danger doctrine is not applicable to investi-
gations as it is to legislation. If Congress can legislate in the face of a
clear and present danger, it would be sheer folly not to investigate a
potential danger. United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947).
Contra, United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954); Alfange,
supra note 90, at 130-32. However, since the fifth amendment grants
absolute immunity while the first amendment's immunity can be bal-
anced away, this would imply that the fifth amendment is more pre-
ferred than the first. Meiklejohn, supra note 79. Yet Congress can
avoid the fifth amendment by granting immunity.
92. Between 1944 and 1957 there were a substantial number of
contempt citations originating from HUAC. Of these, about 70% were
defended on the fifth amendment. Convictions in these cases were few.
See C. BECK, CONTEMPT OF CowNREss, App. B (1959). The cases look
suspicious and one tends to think that HUAC was aware of a valid
defense on the part of the witness but wanted to be sure that the
witness was exposed, so the contempt citation was brought on the theory
that if the court did not agree that there was contempt, the court could
refuse to convict. If the committee maintains this apparently obnoxious
attitude, it could achieve the same thing even if the first amendment
were a valid defense. The contempt citation could be brought and the
court or grand jury could refuse to convict or indict, but the publicity is
present and the witness has been exposed. See United States v. Welden,
377 U.S. 95, 118 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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refuse to convict93 after the harm has been done.
3. The Fourth Amendment
As a result of the abuses of general arrest and search war-
rants, the fourth amendment guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, papers, and homes against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. The framers of the amendment
realized that happiness of the individual depended upon spirit-
ual as well as material rights, and that the right to be protected
from unjustified and arbitrary governmental intrusion was one
of the rights most valued by civilized men and a right essential
to a democratic society.9 4 The fourt;h amendment effectuates
this belief9 5 by interposing as a standard between the govern-
mental action and the individual96 the requirement that, upon
an application for a warrant,97 there be a showing of reasonable-
ness and probable cause as determined by an independent judi-
cial officer.98 This standard must be met before the government
93. Due to the procedural requirements of bringing a contempt
citation, the case may never reach a court since the grand jury may
refuse to indict or merely ignore the citation. See C. BacK, CONTEMPT OF
CoNGREss, App. B (1959).
94. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). This case in-
volved the use of evidence in a criminal trial obtained by wiretapping.
In a dissenting opinion, Brandeis stated:
The protection guaranteed by the [fourth and fifth] Amend-
ments is much broader in scope. The makers of our constitu-
tion undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that
only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to
be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions. They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized man.
Id. at 478. This passage was relied upon by Justice Goldberg in his
concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965).
Justice W. Douglas, The Attack on the Right to Privacy, Playboy, Dec.
1967, at 189.
95. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
96. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); see Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217, 254-56 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 339 U.S. 1
(1950).
97. See cases cited note 95 supra. Where the fourth amendment
requires that a warrant be issued, the standard for the issuance of the
warrant is reasonableness which is determined by whether there is
probable cause for the search.
98. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 (1963); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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is allowed to interfere with the individual. It prevents a fishing
expedition on the chance that something discreditable might
turn up.'
Because of its historical background, the fourth amendment
has traditionally been limited to cases in which there has been
an actual physical search or a seizure in the tort sense of taking
into custody.100 Thus, as applied to a subpoena duces tecum,
under which a congressional investigator orders a witness to pro-
duce papers or documents, the fourth amendment requires that
the search be both reasonable and based upon probable cause.
The Court has interpreted the reasonableness standard to limit
the quantity of documents subpoenaed, and to require that the
documents be identified with reasonable specificity.101 In ap-
plying the probable cause standard, the Court requires that ma-
terial subpoenaed must reasonably appear to contain information
pertinent to the inquiry and that the subpoena not be merely
exploratory. 0 2 Even though the Court requires reasonableness
and probable cause for a subpoena duces tecum,10 3 it appears
99. Ellis v. ICC, 237 U.S. 434, 445 (1915). See Jones v. SEC, 298
U.S. 1, 26 (1936); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-07
(1924); ICC v. Brinson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168, 190-96 (1880); J. STORY, EQUITABLE PLEADING § 325 (1892).
Searching in the mere hope of turning up a crime is not permissible.
FTC v. American Tobacco Co., supra at 306; United States v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 335 (1915).
100. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 12 (3d ed. 1964).
101. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213
(1946); Jones v. SEC, 293 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1936); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 76 (1906); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621, 634-35 (1886); Annenberg v. Roberts,
333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612, 617 (1938). See McPhaul v. United States, 364
U.S. 372, 382 (1960); N. LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 137 (1937).
102. It is arguable whether the Court really requires probable cause.
The Court does apply a reasonableness standard, but it may not be the
same as probable cause. The language of the Administrative Procedures
Act § 6, 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1964), seems to require something very similar
to probable cause, but in Powell v. United States, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), the
Court gave that provision an interpretation which does not correspond
with the clear meaning of the Act. The requirements of the Act may,
however, be different from the requirements of a congressional sub-
poena, even though the Court never distinguishes between congressional
and administrative constructive searches. The protections afforded a
witness against an administrative subpoena are more substantial than
those afforded a witness under a congressional subpoena which gives
the Court a ground upon which to distinguish the cases.
103. The Court has decided congressional and administrative in-
vestigation cases on the basis of the reasonableness standard, and has
applied this only to limit the amount of information which may be
subpoenaed. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
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that it does not apply these standards to subpoenas ad testifi-
candum 0 4
However, the interpretation of the scope of the fourth
amendment should not be limited by its history.' 5 Even under
a literal interpretation of the amendment, the right to be free
from invasions of one's mind may be protected. The right
of the people to be secure in their persons from unreasonable
searches certainly can be interpreted to include searches of the
mind as well as searches of the physical person. This interpre-
tation is only reasonable, for the privacy of the mind should be
accorded at least as much, if not more protection from unwar-
ranted searches as the individual's body, his house, papers, and
effects. 10 6 The essence of the offense is not the searching of
186, 209 (1946); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); ICC v. Brimson,
154 U.S. 447 (1894). Most of the cases deal with the subpoenas of an
administrative agency, but the Court does not distinguish these
searches from those by a congressional committee as both are "con-
structive" searches. See also Driver, Constitutional Limitations on the
Power of Congress To Punish Contempts of Its Investigating Committees,
38 VA. L. REV. 887, 898-902 (1952). As to the requirement of probable
cause for grand jury investigations, see 'Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). It is enough that
the congressional investigation be for a lawful purpose. Wilkinson v.
United States, 365 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1961); Shelton v. United States, 280
F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1960). In both these cases, however, the Court em-
phasized that petitioner was not summoned as a result of an indiscrim-
inate dragnet. See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Wilkinson v. United
States, supra at 417-20, wherein he argues that the committee did not
have probable cause, and if an uncontested statement by an informant
provided probable cause, all the members of the Court would be subject
to investigation. See generally FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298, 306 (1924); Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33 (1917); Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911). The investigation is not limited by a forecast
of the probable result. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
104. The lack of authority as to whether a subpoena ad testificandum
can be an unreasonable search and seizure results from the Court's
definition of "unreasonablenness." It is much easier to prove that
the burden of producing a vast number of records is unreasonable
than that producing testimony is unreasonable. This is especially true
in congressional investigations where there is a strong presumption that
the testimony sought is pertinent to a valid legislative purpose. In ad-
ministrative cases it is documents rather than testimony which the
agencies primarily seek. There is, however, indirect authority to sup-
port this requirement. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 84-88 (1959)(Brennan, J., dissenting); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198(1957); Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963); ASP, Inc. v.
Capital Bank & Trust Co., 174 So. 2d 809, 816 (La. App. 1965).
105. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 257, 266 (1960); Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365-66 (1959).
106. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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physical objects, but the invasion of the indefeasible right of
personal security. 0 7
Moreover, a literal interpretation of the specific language
is not necessary for the Court has become increasingly aware
that the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are not limited
to the specific rights mentioned. Such a restricted interpreta-
tion would make these rights meaningless. s0 8 Instead, the Court
has stated that the Bill of Rights encompasses not only those
activities specifically mentioned but also activities peripheral to
those-a penumbra of rights. 0 9  Thus, the right to be secure
from unwarranted searches of one's mind should be protected as
sufficiently peripheral to the fourth amendment security in
one's person. Furthermore, the penumbra theory could be ap-
plied not through a special amendment, but through the due
process clauses." 0
V. THE REALITIES OF INVESTIGATIONS"'
Both the overt and the covert motivation behind investiga-
tions greatly affect the manner in which the investigation is
107. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). This proposi-
tion was cited with approval in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1965).
108. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
109. Id. at 484, 486-99.
110. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 389 U.S. 523 (1967); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The Court protects privacy
in certain cases under the due process clauses of the Constitution.
The theory behind such protection is that various amendments of the
Bill of Rights indicate a right of privacy which can be protected under
the penumbra theory of the due process clauses. Also, due process
does not even require that the protection stem from any or all of the
first ten amendments, but it may come as an individual right reserved
to the individual by the ninth amendment or a right basic to an or-
dered and free society.
111. There are basically four types of investigations other than
congressional ones: criminal, civil, grand jury, and administrative in-
vestigations. Each of these has its own procedures and protections for
witnesses which, for the most part, eliminate the problems which are
present under congressional investigations and provide a basis upon
which to distinguish these from congressional investigations in the ap-
plication of a probable cause standard.
Criminal and civil investigations protect the witness through the
adversary system and the rules of evidence. A witness will not be called
to testify unless he has some information relevant to the inquiry and
can be compelled to testify. Also, there is usually less publicity, thus
the social consequences imposed upon a witness for refusing to testify
are not as great. Furthermore, the civil pretrial investigations are
usually private and not subject to the publicity of congressional in-
vestigations. See Note, The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary
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conducted and, consequently, the rights of witnesses. While there
is undeniable value in allowing congressional investigations, 112
several factors unique to the political atmosphere"1 3 in which
Rule in Civil Cases, 43 DENVER L.J. 511 (1.966); Note, Evidence Illegally
Obtained by Private Persons Held Admissible in State Civil Action, 63
CoLu M. L. REV. 168 (1963).
Grand jury investigations pose the same problems as criminal in-
vestigations, except that the grand jury proceeding is usually not open
to the public, thus allowing a witness to plead the fifth amendment
without social repercussions. The grand jury may, however, provide
immunity, but until it is a known fact that he has information relevant
to the investigation, this testimony is not made public by forcing the
witness to testify at trial. See Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MIcH.
L. REv. 455 (1965); Note, Rules of Evidence as a Factor in Probable
Cause in Grand Jury Proceedings and Preliminary Examinations, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 102.
The administrative investigations may have the same deficiencies
as congressional investigations. Administrative investigations involve
primarily two types of searches, actual and constructive. See Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1945). When there is a
search by an administrative agency, it deals with the enforcement of
some law already in existence and is lited to searches necessary to
carry out the function of the agency in enforcing the law. Spot checks
are allowed because they are necessary to enforce a constitutional law
and because they carry no intimation of guilt but generally only a
warning to the person checked. However, the Court has recently held
that a warrant is required for such a search. Camara v. Municipal
Court, 389 U.S. 523 (1967). Moreover, if the search is constructive,
different standards are applied. Under the Administrative Procedure
Act § 6(c), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1964), the requirements for issuance of
subpoenas appear similar to probable cause. However, in United States
v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), the Court said the only requirements were
that the subpoena not be a fishing expedition, and that the tax records
subpoenaed must reasonably appear to be relevant to the inquiry. Also,
when a law already exists, the duty to testify is stronger than the duty to
testify in congressional investigations. This is evidenced by the fact that
there may be no fifth amendment plea in many administrative investiga-
tions. However, although most of these investigations do not produce
adverse social consequences, this is foreseeable. In that case, there would
be substantial justification for applying a probable cause standard before
subpoenaing a witness to testify.
112. Even HUAC is not valueless. See, e.g., Auerbach, Some Com-
ments on the Case for the House Un-American Activities Committee,
47 Mm-NN. L. REV. 593 (1963). Professor Auerbach points out that 35 of
HUAC's recommendations have become law while 61 others have not.
HUAC also provides valuable information to Congressmen and can in-
form the public about antidemocratic movements operating in this coun-
try. However, this could be accomplished without any use of the sub-
poena power.
113. Neither the procedures nor the personalities involved in con-
gressional investigations is comparable to investigations held by courts
or even administrative agencies. Many committees operate without
adequate rules defining the rights of witnesses. Because this is not a
judicial proceeding, the principles of due process do not apply. Con-
gressmen who conduct these investigations are often seeking publicity
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these investigations function operate to restrict the constitu-
tional rights of witnesses testifying in these proceedings. As
seen in the foregoing, the basic philosophical limitation upon
the scope and motivation of congressional investigations is the
view of our government as a tripartite unit. This structure dic-
tates that congressional investigations be carried on only to col-
lect information for possible legislation. However, it is not
startling that this view of our government is not correct, and
it is widely recognized that all three branches of government
carry out functions which are within the theoretically exclusive
realm of another branch.
Congress does investigate to collect information for effective
legislation; it also investigates to maintain the balance of power
between itself and the other branches, 114 to supervise the vast
administrative branch of government, 115 to educate or inform the
public,"1 and to propagandize." 7 Exposure is one of the major
and personal agrandizement. Furthermore, and perhaps most signifi-
cant, there is the role of the press. Because of the controversial nature
of many investigations, the press gives complete, and at times spectacu-
lar coverage to these hearings. Because of the chairman's power over
the hearing, all sides do not always get a complete hearing. These all
work to the detriment of the witness.
114. Shapiro, Judicial Review: The Supreme Court's Supervision of
Congressional Investigations, 15 VAND. L. REv. 535, (1962). But cf.
Liacos, Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 B.U.L.
REv. 337, 348 (1953). This argument is based upon the idea that the
Congressmen conducting the investigations are our chosen protectors
while the administrative agents are appointed. The selectivity in sub-
poenaing witnesses by a congressional committee implies a connection
between the witness and the subject matter investigated, so the com-
mittee should be required to balance the individual protection against
the need to maintain a balance of power in this way. See also McCray
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 55 (1904) (the solution lies with the
people, not the Court).
The effectiveness with which Congress can carry out many of its
traditional functions is in large part indirectly dependent upon the power
to investigate. Shapiro, supra at 540-42. For example, Congress has to
compete with the President for public attention and support to be able
to pass an independent judgment on legislative proposals made by the
President. See Liacos, supra at 344.
115. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); J. BURNHAM,
CONGRESS Am THE AmERIcAN TRADITrON 233-34 (1959). See Sinclair v.
United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1927). The first congressional investigation was of a blunder by the
Department of War. This power may be pursuant to U.S. CoNsT. art. 1,
§ 2, which gives Congress power to supervise government personnel
subject to impeachment, but it is exercised far beyond this limited
purpose. J. BURNHAM, supra.
116. Shapiro, supra note 114.
117. C. FRMnRICu, CONs=UruioNAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMocnAcy 297
(rev. ed. 1950); W. WiLsoN, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 183, 198
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congressional sources of power for it creates an independent
source of public support and, as such, it may be a valid congres-
sional purpose for investigations.11 8 It is difficult to accept the
validity of this purpose when investigations are directed against
individuals rather than problem areas, for it is not the proper
function of Congress to judge the conduct of an individual" 9
and then both persecute and prosecute him because of it. Yet
the publicity and other factors which make the congressional in-
vestigation an effective tool in bringing about benefits may be
so perverted that they infringe upon the constitutionally pro-
tected rights of the individual.
The effectiveness with which a congressional investigation
can execute any of the foregoing functions is, in large part, de-
pendent upon the publicity accorded the investigation. 120 A
calm, quiet, orderly, and intelligently conducted investigation
may receive little or no publicity while a spectacular investi-
gation will capture the public's attention.12 1  The spectacular
investigation, however, works to the detriment of the witness.
Even before the witness appears to testify, the mere fact of being
subpoenaed to appear before a notorious committee and of being
associated with the subject matter under investigation and the
testimony of prior witnesses may lead to public condemnation
and economic reprisals. 1 22  Once before the committee, the at-
tempts of the Congressmen to create a spectacular atmosphere
by overstating and dramatizing the testimony of a witness
12 3
(Meridan ed. 1956). Congressional investigations also collect informa-
tion to be used subsequently in criminal trials, United States v. Welden,
377 U.S. 95 (1964); United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (N.D. Ill.
1906); Shapiro, supra note 114, at 545, and to control the expression of
political ideas and criticism. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,
197-98 (1957); Carr, Investigations in Oper'ation: The Un-American Ac-
tivities Committee, 18 U. CHm. L. REv. 598 (1951). See Braden v.
United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S.
399 (1961).
118. Shapiro, supra note 114; see Yelin v. United States, 374 U.S.
109 (1963).
119. Except in the case of impeachments, Congress cannot carry
on a judicial function. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
120. "Publicity is the antiseptic of the democratic body politic."
Finer, Congressional Investigations: The British System, 18 U. CH. L.
REv. 521 (1951).
121. Compare the lack of publicity given the recent investigations
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, TIME, April 7, 1967, at 15,
with the widespread publicity given to Senator McCarthy's investiga-
tions of Communist infiltration and the Army.
122. Note 2 supra; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
cf. HUAC Rule IV.
123. Shils, Congressional Investigations: The Legislator and his En-
vironment, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 571 (1951).
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increase the social sanctions imposed upon the witness.
The power of exposure, when used against the individual,
leads to the most obnoxious abuses of the congressional power
of investigation. A Congressman, seeking personal aggrandize-
ment, may decide to attack an individual who, though not vio-
lating any law, is morally culpable in the opinion of the Con-
gressman. 12 4 By subpoenaing the individual, the Congressman
124. See Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Jones v. SEC,
298 U.S. 1 (1936). In reversing the contempt conviction, the Court said:
The fear that some malefactor may go unwhipped of justice
weighs as nothing against this just and strong condemnation of
a practice so odious. And, indeed, the fear itself has little of
substance upon which to rest. The federal courts are open to
the government ....
The philosophy that constitutional limitations and legal re-
straints upon official action may be brushed aside upon the plea
that good, perchance, may follow, finds no countenance in the
American system of government.
Id. at 27.
Justice Holmes, in dissent, stated: "More important still, the en-
forcement of the Act is aided when guilt is exposed to the censure of
the world, though the witness in the act of speaking may make punish-
ment impossible." Id. at 31. It is interesting to observe the switch in
position. Until the late 1940's, it was the "liberals" who were calling
for more investigations and more freedom of exposure. In the past
twenty years the position has exactly reversed.
Jerry Voorhis, U.S. Representative (D. Cal. 1937-1947) and member
of HUAC, argues that congressional investigations may be democracy's
most effective method of guarding against movements which operate
within the law but seek to destroy our freedom. The primary purpose
of these investigations is not to legislate, but to expose people to
the public. Voorhis, Congressional Investigations: Inner Workings, 18
U. Cmi. L. Rzv. 455 (1951). Richard Nixon felt that HUAC has a solemn
responsibility to find people who had been Communists but were
immune from grand jury investigation because of the statute of limi-
tations.
A court would have to be blind not to see that investigations are
used to carry out personal goals. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,
44 (1953). See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Congressmen also use investigations to
set the standards for acceptable political thought and to quiet dissent
or criticism by intimidating with threat of exposure. See Braden v.
United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S.
399 (1961).
There are numerous other personal motives involved. A legislator
may be trying to soften an administrative agency, to soften or strengthen
the effect of a particular bill, or to satisfy a personal vengeance. Marx,
Congressional Investigations: Significance for the Administrative Proc-
ess, 18 U. Cmi. L. REv. 503, 513 (1951). The legislator lives in a general
environment of distrust and suspicion; consequently, he may be more
critical of deviant behavior than the average citizen. Also, because of
political activities, a legislator tends to propagandize issues in black
and white and overstate his case. Shils, supra note 123, at 571. Chief
Justice Warren, in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957),
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may bring the wrath of the almighty public down upon the in-
dividual although the individual actually had no connection with
the topic under investigation. 125 None of the protections con-
sidered basic to an ordered scheme of justice applies, for this is a
trial by public opinion, not by law.12  The ability of a witness
states that investigations which are carried on solely for personal ag-
grandizement or to punish those investigated are indefensible.
125. The inadequacy of the protection afforded summoned witnesses
can best be demonstrated by relating the saga of Robert Shelton. The
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee heard testimony by Winston M.
Burdett, a foreign journalist who had been a member of the Communist
Party from 1937 to 1940, that Communists had infiltrated the newspaper
industry. Subsequent to this testimony the Subcommittee received a
letter from a reliable source that one "Sheldon" who worked for the
New York Times was informed about if not a member of a Communist
group. This letter was never produced in court. At first the govern-
ment refused to release it as it contained confidential information, and
by the time the court ordered its production, it had been inadvertently
destroyed.
On the basis of this information the Subcommittee authorized a
subpoena in the name of Willard Shelton. In attempting to serve the
subpoena it was learned that there was no one by that name working
for the Times, but that a Robert Shelton worked as a news copy editor,
and several other Sheldons worked in the printing department. The
Subcommittee reauthorized the subpoena in the name Robert Shelton.
When Robert Shelton appeared to testify the Subcommittee admitted
that there was no reason to believe he, Robert Shelton, was a Com-
munist or had information concerning Communist activities, but, in
order to clear up the matter, asked him whether he was a Communist.
Robert Shelton refused to answer this question, arguing that the Sub-
committee must have probable cause to believe that a person has in-
formation pertinent to the subject matter under lawful inquiry to com-
pel an answer. In United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 (D.D.C.
1957), the court argued that the pertinency requirement gave ample
protection, and that the judiciary should not judge matters within the
discretion of Congress. There was no probable cause requirement. Id.
at 933. On appeal, the court affirmed. Shelton v. United States, 280
F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The court recognized that there could be no
pillory or indiscriminate dragnet of witnesses, but believed that non-
Communists knew about Communist activities and the information as
to whether Shelton was a Communist would be helpful in evaluating
his testimony. Id. at 706-08. The court avoided the problem that
Robert Shelton had not given any testimony to be evaluated. The
Supreme Court reversed on the basis that the grand jury indictment
did not specify the subject under inquiry. Russell v. United States, 369
U.S. 749 (1962).
Shelton was again convicted on a new certificate of contempt,
United States v. Shelton, 211 F. Supp. 869 (D.D.C. 1962), but this con-
viction was reversed on the basis that the subpoena was illegally issued
since the Subcommittee counsel, not the Subcommittee, made the de-
cision to subpoena Shelton. Shelton v. United States, 327 F.2d 601
(D.C. Cir. 1963). See Bendick, First Amendment Standards for Con-
gressional Investigations, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 311 (1963).
126. See Hannah v. Larch, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
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to rely upon constitutional or technical defenses is reduced by
the fear that the assertion of such defenses will be an implicit
admission of guilt in the eyes of the public. Because of the
Court's refusal to consider the motives of Congressmen, it has,
in the face of clear evidence, consistently refused to see that
there is in fact exposure for exposure's sake.127  The Court, by
not taking affirmative action to control this evil, has permitted
a few legislative investigators, using the techniques of mass
hysteria, to control the expression of ideas.1 28  The individual
has no means to evade this method of control except to avoid
the expression of any ideas which might become controversial
and therefore come to the attention of a notorious committee.
Once the individual appears before the investigation the damage
has been done and his assertion that he is ignorant of the evil
under investigation will be of no avail.
VI. THE SOLUTION
Once a congressional investigation gains public support it is
nearly impossible to limit or stop it. The same factors which
lead to abuses of the rights of witnesses ensure the continuation
of the investigation. For example, if the public is led to believe
that Communism poses a serious threat to national security, an
individual subpoenaed by ITUAC will be socially convicted of be-
ing a Communist. Although the danger may be exaggerated or
nonexistent, few Congressmen will be willing to risk their polit-
ical future by voting to limit or abolish such an investigating
committee. Furthermore, because the whole Congress has au-
thorized the investigation, the Court will assume that there is
sufficient potential danger to warrant the investigation.
The rights of the individual which must be protected are
127. See, e.g., Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 710 & n.8
(1966). "'By this means,' Congressman Francis E. Walter, D. Pa., said,
'Active communists will be exposed before their neighbors and fellow
workers; and I have every confidence that the loyal Americans who
work with them will do the rest of the job.'" Braden v. United
States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399
(1961).
128. This violates the principle that we are a government of laws,
not of men, for it allows certain individuals, unrestrained by legal
processes, to punish. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 136 (1951). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
475, 478 (1928) (right to be let alone); American School of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109-10 (1902). Attempts by other
members of Congress to stop these abuses in favor of formal disci-
pline would lead to honorable martyrdom. H. LASswELL, NATIONAL
SECURITY AND INDiviDUAL FREEDOm (1950).
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the rights to freedom of belief and expression; yet, because of
the admitted need of Congress to gather information necessary
for effective legislation, these rights must be balanced against
the national interest in legislation. As seen in the foregoing,
the standards used to judge the duty of the individual to testify
are inadequate in two respects. They fail to protect the individ-
ual from the social abuses which result from being subpoenaed
and testifying, and they fail to adequately recognize the motives
behind the investigations. Numerous legislative safeguards have
been proposed, but while these might afford the witness more
rights while actually before the investigating committee, they
are inadequate for they fail to guard the individual from the
public exposure and harassment caused by the initial govern-
mental interference of being subpoenaed.129 Moreover, the leg-
islative solutions are unrealistic because Congress will not im-
pose these limitations upon itself.
80
Because the situation has reached a political impasse, it
is the duty of the Court to step in arLd protect the rights of the
individual.' 3' It is suggested that t:he Court should require a
showing of probable cause, as required by the fourth amendment,
before allowing the issuance of a subpoena requiring an appear-
ance before a congressional investigation. Many of the same
competing factors as in criminal investigations are at work and
the idea of fair play, essential to the Bill of Rights, is equally
applicable.
The whole philosophical basis for the fourth amendment's
protection against searches and seizuires without probable cause
is the notion that the individual has the right to keep the affairs
of his life private. While this right is admittedly not absolute,
for it must be balanced against the moral and statutory duty of
the individual to aid the legislature by revealing certain infor-
mation, it is a right so basic to our concept of a limited govern-
129. Galloway, Congressional Investigations: Proposed Reforms, 18
U. Cni. L. REV. 478 (1951); Maslow, Fair Procedure in Congressional
Investigations: A Proposed Code, 54 COLTm. L. REv. 839 (1954).
130. At times when Communism is a threat to the United States, it
would be almost certain political suicide for most Congressmen to pro-
pose such restrictions. See H. PAcKER, Ex-CoMuNIsT WIxTNESSES:
Fou STUDIES IN FACT FINDING 241 (1962).
131. The Court has, in the past, violated its own principle of judi-
cial self-restraint and decided clearly political questions when it be-
came apparent that the political system had broken down. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). See also Diver, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of
Congress To Punish Contempts of its Investigating Committees, 38 VA.
L. REv. 1011, 1031-33 (1952).
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ment 32 that it should not be lightly disregarded.
To be of any real worth to the individual, the right of pri-
vacy must be recognized by all forms of governmental activity.133
Although the Court is willing to recognize the invasion of pri-
vacy if it results in criminal sanctions, the Court must recognize
that governmental exposure which results in social sanctions
can be just as disastrous to the individual. Indeed, "law" itself
has been defined as those beliefs which are imposed on every
member of society by those persons in control of the monopoly
of legitimate force.' 34
Furthermore, the right of privacy must protect the individ-
ual's mind as well as his possessions. The Court has protected
certain contents of the mind from governmental invasions in
criminal proceedings under the fifth amendment. However, the
basic recognition that a person's mind is his most sacred posses-
sion and should be accorded the greatest protection from gov-
ernmental invasion is equally applicable to all forms of govern-
mental action. Moreover, the individual's mind should be
accorded as much, if not more, protection than his possessions
for he therein keeps his most private possessions--his memory
and his thoughts. Certainly the exposure of thoughts should
be prohibited as repugnant to our notion of a limited govern-
ment. 35 A democratic form of government can exist only in a
climate in which the right to think, question, and disagree is
guaranteed. If the right to privacy is abolished, the freedom to
think may be destroyed.
The factors on the other side of the balance must also be
recognized; it is admitted that Congress does need information
to be able to legislate effectively. While the vast majority of
committee investigations can be conducted without compelling
testimony, 30 Congress may need the power to compel testimony
in order to collect information in certain areas. The requirement
that a congressional investigation demonstrate a need for the
testimony of a particular individual and show probable cause to
132. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Brandeis, J.,
dissenting, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928); see also
text accompanying note 105 supra.
133. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 389 U.S. 523 (1967).
134. M. WEBER, LAw IN ECONOMY AND SocImY (1954).
135. The first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to the Constitu-
tion set up an idea of government with which the exposure of thoughts
is surely inconsistent.
136. It is interesting to note that, with one exception, all the con-
tempt citations brought under either 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1964) or 2 U.S.C.
§ 194 (1964) were for contempt of HUAC or SCIC.
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believe that a particular individual possesses information perti-
nent to the subject under inquiry would provide an effective
method of safeguarding the individual's right to freedom of ex-
pression and privacy. It would also allow Congress the neces-
sary power to collect information.
The two major objections to such a requirement appear to
be, first, that such a requirement would restrain the legislature
prior to passage of legislation and would consequently violate
the separation of powers principle; and, second, that it would
put an overwhelming burden on botla Congress and the courts.
However, these fears appear to be unfounded. The restraint
placed upon the legislature would not be significant for the
courts would not be determining which topics Congress could
and could not investigate, but rather the limited issue as to
whether Congress could validly subpoena a specific individual.
Such limited restraints have been imposed on Congress in the
past; it is unrealistic to believe that Congress would rebel at
this. The fear that such a requirement would place an over-
whelming burden on Congress and the courts is also unrealistic.
The vast majority of individuals willingly appear to testify; it
is only in the small minority of investigations in which Con-
gress seeks information from hostile witnesses that it would
actually have to demonstrate a need for the information and
probable cause for believing that the individual did, in fact,
possess information pertinent to the subject under inquiry. In
these few instances the requirement of showing probable cause
will provide both a formal and an informal check on abuses. 37
The inconvenience that this requirement would cause Congress
is not dispositive, for the Court has stated that if the burden of
obtaining a warrant will not frustrate the governmental purpose,
such requirement will be imposed. 38 In determining the stand-
ard for probable cause the Court balances the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies the official intrusion against
the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen. 39
The protection which this requirement would afford the
witness, in comparison with the burden it imposes upon Congress,
is significant. The individual will be able to force investigators
to show reason to believe that he will be able to provide useful
information before they can interrupt his life. This will force
137. If a committee does not have probable cause, it can use one
of the federal agencies to investigate and get the necessary information.
138. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
139. Id.
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the investigation to evaluate its need for his testimony before
going to the trouble of subpoenaing him. Once subpoenaed, the
individual will have a basis upon which to contest his duty to
testify. He will not have to risk criminal prosecution in order
to contest this duty for he will be able to challenge the probable
cause for his subpoena prior to testifying. If the court finds
that the individual does have a duty to testify, he will either
have to rely on the fifth amendment, risk criminal prosecution
for contempt, or provide the information required. This will
work to the advantage of both the investigation and the indi-
vidual-the committee will not waste its time examining a re-
luctant wvitness unless it needs his testimony, and in the latter
situation it will more likely get the desired information. If
the individual was correct in his belief that he had no duty to
testify, he will have avoided most of the social and economic
consequences of being subpoenaed and appearing before the in-
vestigation as a hostile witness. Although the determination of
the validity of the subpoena would be public record, it is unlikely
that it would receive the same amount of publicity as the actual
investigation. 140
Under the present system, although the threat of criminal
contempt may coerce a hostile witness into testifying, all Con-
gress usually accomplishes is causing the witness to violate the
law and go to jail as a consequence.' 4 ' By requiring the showing
of probable cause the rights of the individual can be effectively
protected while still allowing Congress the right to investigate.
140. The factors militating against extreme exposure in a court pro-
ceeding testing the probable cause for the issuance of the subpoena are
1) the parties in the action are less likely to be as flamboyant and
publicity minded as in certain congressional committees; 2) only prob-
able cause is being questioned rather than socially condemned actions or
attitudes; 3) the procedure is in a judicial atmosphere with a tendency
to protect the rights of individuals; 4) the attorneys representing the
parties are more likely to be somewhat conservative in their statements
to the press than would be the investigators; and 5) the press will prob-
ably not focus as directly on such judicial proceedings as important
news as they would on a failure to testify before a notorious committee.
141. In reality, however, the threat of going to jail may not be
significant because of the Court's tendency to reverse convictions on
the basis of technical errors.
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